Abstract: After having pointed out the diverse uses of the term "infrastructure" in the literature on the market-economy, the different categories of infrastructure will be described. The argument in this context is that the classification of infrastructure suggested by Jochimsen has proved useful: institutional, personal, and material infrastructure. On this basis a concept for the definition of infrastructure will be developed. The hitherto taken approach to understanding infrastructure, especially material infrastructure, mainly referring to the attributes of infrastructure, will be rejected. Rather it will be attempted to characterize infrastructure by its essential functions. We then may discuss the development-theoretic implications of infrastructure. Finally, infrastructure policy will be introduced in relation to institutional, material and personal infrastructure.
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Present use of the term "infrastructure"
In the field of economics Tinbergen (1962: 133) introduces the distinction between infrastructure (for example, roads and education) and superstructure (comprising manufacturing, agricultural and mining activities). However, in this context, we neither find precise definitions nor any theoretic references of these terms.
Nowadays, Nijkamp (2000: 88) speaks about infrastructure as material public capital (roads, railways, (air)ports, pipelines etc.) and suprastructure meaning immaterial public capital (knowledge networks, communication, education, culture etc.), again without specifying the proposed terms in sufficient detail.
The first systematic approach for the market-economy we owe to Jochimsen. For him "infrastructure is defined as the sum of material, institutional and personal facilities and data which are available to the economic agents and which contribute to realizing the equalization of the remuneration of comparable inputs in the case of a suitable allocation of resources, that is complete integration and maximum level of economic activities" (Jochimsen 1966: 100) . This definition distinguishing between material, institutional and personal infrastructure Jochimsen (1966: 31-39) bases on his comprehensive critique of Eucken's theory on the data of an economy (Eucken 1965 : 127-162, Eucken 1955 . However, Jochimsen's definition has the disadvantage of not making factor price equalization concrete which, by the way, theoretically cannot be maintained under realistic assumptions (cf. Christiaans 1997) . Moreover, we must critically point out that Jochimsen (1966: 103) understands material infrastructure to be an enumeration of essentially public facilities characterized by specific attributes.
Until today we cannot dispose of a well-founded and useful definition of infrastructure ("infra" stems from the Latin language, meaning below, thus "infrastructure" can be taken to express "foundation"). Numerous formulations have been put to the test, leading to a substantial diversity and complexity of suggestions and problems which shall not be described here in detail (cf., for example, Jochimsen/Gustafsson 1970a , 1970b , Frey 1972 , 1978 , Biehl 1986 , Nijkamp 1986 , Lakshmanan 1989 , Aberle 1995 , Rietveld/Bruinsma 1998 , Haughwout 2000b , Nijkamp 2000 . All of these formulations have in common that infrastructure, essentially material infrastructure, is to be supplied by the state. Also, in the public discussion, the term made a successful terminological career, rising to a formula of political technocracy. Traditionally, "infrastructure" has been applied to permanent installations required for military purposes. Modern general usage of the term 2 concerns the necessary economic and organizational foundation of a highly developed economy (transport network, labor force etc.) (Drosdowski/ScholzeStubenrecht/Wermke 1997: 359) .
The reason for this unsatisfactory situation is that the simultaneous realization of three analytic objectives difficult to grasp and not necessarily compatible with each other has been aimed at. These objectives are -the formulation of a concept for the term "infrastructure", -the incorporation of theoretic approaches (for example, the theory of public goods), and -the description of the reality of infrastructure provision.
Since such a research project turns out to be much too complicated and ambitious, we shall concentrate on the more modest approach of solely analyzing the first objective, the formulation of a concept for the definition of infrastructure relevant for the dynamic theory of economic development. The preliminary working topic is as follows: What are the essential preconditions for the privately organized division of labor, that is, for market-relevant private production and capital formation? Or: what are the prerequisites in a comprehensive, total view to economic growth? Observe that these questions are not related to any economic objective, following the tradition of neoliberal thinking.
These questions form the gist of the term "infrastructure" whose introduction can only be justified by the complementarities of material, institutional and personal infrastructure in relation to economic development. The identification of the term "infrastructure" with the term "material infrastructure" as it can often be found in the literature is an unnecessary and misleading contraction of the term, nothing but a misunderstanding of the problems to be discussed.
The regional or spatial reference of infrastructure is not controversial. However, here the hitherto pursued approach to understanding infrastructure mainly with respect to its attributes (cf. Youngson 1967) will be rejected. Rather we shall strive to characterize infrastructure by its essential functions. They are called "essential" since they initiate changes of economic variables, e.g. changes of costs of the firms or changes of household utilities. In this manner of advance, the human being, the economic agent, is taken to be an individual and, at the same time, a member of the community which is not identical to the state (as the overall term for all public bodies and institutions). The state is here understood as one possible, but not the only form of organizing the community to solve problems of the society (cf. also Etzioni 1995) . The harmonization of individual interests and their adjustment to and the creation of public welfare are considered as an important problem that shall not be discussed here. Lack of public concern on the side of individuals or individuals' behavior detrimental to public welfare (or even perverse behavior of individuals) are excluded from analysis as problems to be attended by an adequate policy of the economic order (Ordnungspolitik). An example of such undesirable behavior is free-riding.
The categorization of infrastructure according to Jochimsen (1966: 100) will be accepted here; however, the sequence of categories given by him will be changed, following the neoliberal view of economic growth processes.
The provision of institutional infrastructure is considered to be a task of the state.
However, private agents or organizations, in principle, are taken to be responsible for supplying personal infrastructure and material infrastructure. Government activities are not excluded. "Research now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparably state-owned firms" (Megginson/Netter 2001:380) . For an example deviating from the traditional notion of higher efficiency of private activities in comparison to public action cf. de Fraja (1993) . In general, we join the position of Tinbergen (1962: 132-133 ) that the decision on the public or private provision of personal and material infrastructure should be subject to cost-benefit analysis (cf. also, for instance,
Edwards 1992).
Although still in contrast to reality in many aspects, the assumption of mainly private production of personal and material infrastructure fits well into the concept of infrastructure proposed in this paper which is influenced by neoliberal economic thinking. There is no solid argument for permanent and comprehensive state activities in these two fields of infrastructure. Besides, the reorganization of public production to private provision of infrastructure is an important topic of the present policy debate, at least in most industrialized countries, a first step being deregulation (cf., for example, Crandall 1997 , Rothengatter 1997 , Willms 1998 , Peltzman/Winston 2000; observe also that the problem of an insufficient supply of public capital services as pointed out by Galbraith (1971: 221-238) does not exist ex definitione, for a discussion cf. Böckels/Scharf/Widmaier 1976).
From a systematic point of view it is advisable to distinguish between the effects and the determinants of infrastructure, specifying each approach by the category of infrastructure under investigation (cf. Buhr 1977) . The effects of an infrastructure category, for instance material infrastructure, refer to its impacts on demographic and economic variables. Their influences determining infrastructure demand, are summarized under the heading of the determinants of infrastructure. Within this framework it would lead too far to discuss in detail the effects and the determinants of institutional, personal and material infrastructure so that this line of thought must be interrupted here. Government tasks lead to government expenditures which must be covered by government revenues. These tasks are attended by specific bodies politic (for instance, the parliament, administrative authorities, courts). They give good examples for the concerted effects of the different categories of infrastructure.
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The legal constitution also embodies regulations on the relationship of the citizen to the state and on the organization and management of the public sector. Here the creation of concrete procedures is required (for example, organized barter for negotiating budget estimates, for distributing tasks between administrations and for burden sharing among administrative unions) which are determined by political processes and administrative practices.
The law of the economic constitution includes all constitutional rules forming the public-legal foundation of the legal order for the economic sphere (cf. Hall/Soskice 2001 as a recent approach). Since the Grundgesetz does not explicitly indicate a decision for a specific economic system, the problem of the economic constitution lies in the determination of basic rules relevant for the economic constitution. Today there is no longer a controversy on the validity of the essential constitutional principles governing the Grundgesetz (in particular, rule of law, rule of social principles, and postulate of democracy) and the basic rights of the citizen (for example, guarantee of a person's free development and of the freedom of economic activity (above all, freedom of concluding treaties)) for the economic order. In addition, the Grundgesetz points out important special regulations determining economic activities which refer to the mobility of economic agents, the free practice of a profession, the freedom of coalition, and the guarantee of property and inheritance rights.
The supplies of the following public goods indisputably belong to the tasks of the government: legislation and judicature; administration of the community, in particular internal national security; safeguarding fundamental research; maintenance of the value of money in a paper money system; and outward defense, also production of military goods. It is not necessary that the state itself renders these services, the state must only guarantee their provision.
A comprehensive economic assessment of the institutions of the state and their productive activities is nowadays given by the new institutional economics (cf. 
Personal infrastructure (human capital)
It comprehends the number and the relevant properties of the working population (for example, general and special education, qualification in different functions).
That is, we have to deal with population as a stock variable and the labor participation rate that are changed by the birth rate, death rate and migration (quantitative aspect of personal infrastructure) as well as with the characteristics of the working population (qualitative aspect of personal infrastructure).
Personal infrastructure or human capital has marked references to institutional and material infrastructure (for example, consider the implementation of the policy of the economic order or the supply of qualified labor for the production of material infrastructure goods). This inter-generations-problem, at the outset, should be solved without any concern for distributive issues according to the laws of demand for and supply of education (on the present general problems of German university education and their solution by the principles of competition cf. Woll 1973 , Woll 2001 . This means that the supply of education must follow the structure of education demand under the rules of profit-oriented production, thus describing in brief the solution of the problem of the determinants of education infrastructure.
If necessary -and now the policy of the economic order in the framework of the institutional infrastructure comes into the picture -the government may initiate the creation of laws guaranteeing, for instance, equal access to and opportunities of schooling or demanding the general obligation of school attendance according to minimum standards. Elementary education should be supplied by the state to guarantee the development of the fundamental capabilities of communication among the members of society (cf. Woll 1988) . Also the state may exert the supervision of the application of necessary basic legal and administrative rules in the field of education. However, all of these exceptions of government interference do not change the general view of the singularity of education and thus education infrastructure to be privately supported to create and maintain qualitative personal infrastructure.
Material infrastructure
This type of infrastructure is understood to represent capital goods in the form of transportation, education, and health facilities, equipment of energy and water provision, facilities for sewage, garbage disposal, and air purification, building and housing stock, facilities for administrative purposes and for the conservation of natural resources (for subdivisions cf. Biehl 1986: 100-111). Due to its public provision often given in reality, in the literature material infrastructure is also referred to as social overhead capital, social amenities, or public facilities.
Generally accepted are
(1) the distinction between capital equipment and capital services, on the one hand, and operation of a facility or production of output, on the other hand, (2) the spatial representation of material infrastructure (cf. Buhr 1975: 22-25) :
In a horizontal approach we may distinguish point systems (for example, airports, hospitals), point-network systems (for example, telephone services, electricity supply), and network systems (for example, roads)(cf., e.g., Steyer 2001). From a vertical viewpoint we may refer to the continent, the nation, the area, the region, the county, the lot (for example, international highways, interstate highways, expressways, motorways and country roads, through roads and main streets, local streets).
Especially noteworthy is the dynamic interdependence of the effects of material infrastructure (Buhr 1975 : 30-38, Rietveld 1989 , Vickerman 2000 and the determinants of material infrastructure (cf. Buhr 1975: 168-227) , particularly in a regional context. On the interplay in time cf. Buhr 1973 Buhr , 1975 Buhr , 1981 Here the position is taken that output creation of material infrastructure is to follow the general principles of profit-orientation of production, in cases of exception under distribution restrictions.
9
The rejection of the characterization of material infrastructure by its properties is essential for this paper. The following attributes, some of them connected, have been assigned to the capital goods of material infrastructure (cf. Stohler 1965 , Buhr 1975 , Frey 1979 , Biehl 1986 ). This failure is explained, with reference to the supply side, by the invalidity of the exclusion principle and, with reference to the demand side, by the unknown number of privileged demanders undetermined because of utility diffusion and the absence of rivalry of users because of unlimited capacity within certain limits of output production.
By definition, the notion of market failure lacks any solid relationship to reality so that the public goods character of material infrastructure cannot be of concern basically (cf. Woll 1987: 450-454 ).
In addition, most models of public goods aiming at the solution of price formation problems are limited in their extent and contribute little to the theory of public production (cf. Eichhorn/Friedrich 1976 , Schuppert 2000 , Fehling 2001 ).
The characteristics of public goods may be given for material infrastructure goods under very specific conditions, for example, road usage at times of free flow traffic (cf., for instance, Biehl 1986 , Crandall 1997 . However, up to date the public goods problems are solely of theoretical concern (a typical discussion still is Musgrave 1971) and have no importance yet in applied infrastructure economics and planning. A reasonable example for this point is transportation planning (especially cf., for example, Bell/Iida 1997, in general cf. Button 1996) .
The strict identification of material infrastructure with public goods (cf. Andersson 1993 , Haughwout 1996 , 2000a , Colombier 2001 ) is certainly an exaggeration that lies beyond any serious discussion.
The arguments in favor of merit goods which the state must supply or the consumption of which the state must reduce because of "wrong" household preferences run counter to the principle of consumer sovereignty.
Moreover, in reality, economic agents are generally willing to pay a positive price for most material infrastructure goods (for example, electricity). And specifically, users of locationally bound material infrastructure may be understood to form a club. Regarding club goods, prices can be determined (cf. Buchanan 1965 , Starrett 1988 , Guengant/Josselin/Rocaboy 2002 as it is done in practice. A plausible example is given by a regional public passenger transport system organized as a user club (cf. Meyer 2002) .
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The result is that the possible public goods traits of material infrastructure play a subordinate role in the provision of material infrastructure, even more so, if the supply is privately produced. In the improbable case that problems arise, then it is the turn of the policy of the economic order (for example, prohibition of any behavior detrimental to public welfare). On the other hand, it has been argued that state planning is necessary because of the absence of market prices (cf. also Rietveld 1989: 256) .
This point is also without substance in view of price formation by trial and error, derivation of shadow prices or cost apportionment.
(2) Private production under public control: The typical case is that of the natural monopoly (for example, public utilities) (cf. Schumann/Meyer/ Ströbele 1999: 290-296). The justification of public control refers to the protection of the consumers against exploitation as a distributive issue and to the necessary limitation of deficit firm operation to avoid the necessity of public financial support (cf. Button 1996) .
The arguments against this stand taken on the issue are as follows.
Monopoly control is a case of regulation policy which, in the first place, belongs to the field of the policy of the economic order and thus to the realm of institutional infrastructure. Whether the change of market results in the framework of regulation policy, now understood as a process policy, is necessary, is a matter of the given facts. In a dynamic view, monopoly as a form of market organization is subject to technical progress and free market entry. Therefore it is advisable to keep back recommendations on monopoly control that are based on static equilibrium models (Woll 1987 : 457, Spulber 1989 , Bobzin 2002 ).
In addition, market power can be restricted by introducing competition on the level of firm operation as separated from the usage of the capital stock (for instance, rail network management and competition for transport service provision (cf. Bassanini/Nastasi 2001)). Private capital stock use must then regularly be submitted to monopoly control in whatever form.
Moreover, natural monopoly is not the only market form on the supply side of material infrastructure provision (cf. Gramlich 1994 , Crandall 1997 .
Rather the whole range of market types is present in reality, in the extreme nearly perfect competition in housing construction.
In consequence of the above given arguments the term "material infrastructure"
shall not be defined with reference to the properties of material infrastructure, but shall be drawn closer by indicating its functions. This finding generally also applies to institutional and personal infrastructure. 
Functional approach to infrastructure
The economic agents contribute -individually and in interaction with each other -to the creation of the social product which is attributed to the national community. These productive contributions are based on the provision of infrastructure. Let us concentrate here on material infrastructure, since the influences of this category can most easily be understood. The generalization of our considerations to include also institutional and personal infrastructure does not create any additional problems of substance.
Material infrastructure has the function of rendering possible the opening and development of the economic agents' activities. It puts into action the potentialities of economic units for the benefit of society. This is a dynamic view that goes Material infrastructure refers to the capital stocks that serve the function of mobilizing the economic potentialities of economic agents.
The fundamental relevance of the term "infrastructure" in modern societies results from the far-reaching absence of its underlying idea of encouragement of human beings, of creating incentives for economic agents in a dynamic sense.
It seems to be advisable to stress that the definitions of infrastructure, the categories of institutional, personal and material infrastructure, have been developed from "below", starting from a brief description of their functions.
Therefore it would be totally unacceptable to concentrate solely on these definitions, criticize their verbal contents without any reference to what was said about the categories of infrastructure before. It seems also to be a matter of course that it may be necessary to specify these definitions further in order to correspond to particular research objectives.
Development-theoretic implications of infrastructure
Subsequently, we shall depict the development-theoretic importance of the term "infrastructure". For this purpose we shall concentrate on material infrastructure, assuming the complementarity of institutional and personal infrastructure (cf., for example, Hanushek/Kimko 2000).
Emphasis will be laid upon the following development processes.
(1) Growth at low-level (national, regional) product Typical for this situation are economic units (households, enterprises) that are engaged in specific and unspecific activities. For example, production of a defined output is a specific activity of an enterprise, whereas unspecific activities of this firm are its own electricity generation, maintenance of own facilities for water supply, use of its own sewage system as examples of selfsufficient infrastructure provision.
In the process of economic growth the unspecific activities of infrastructure supply become separated from the specific activities of the economic units. New firms and agencies in the field of material infrastructure production will emerge so that non-infrastructure and infrastructure capital stocks will develop at different growth rates in time. Particularly under the assumption of full employment this case supplies a convincing basis for productivity analysis, especially of material infrastructure, concerning the economy as a whole (cf. Aschauer 1989 , Batten/Karlsson 1996 or the relative position of infrastructure production to non-infrastructure production (regarding the contribution of Baumol cf. Krueger 2001: 216-218) .
Main theoretic approaches to be pursued in this field are the solution procedures of sequencing problems of production as they come up, for example, in shipbuilding and machine scheduling (Shephard et al. 1977 , Shephard 1983 , Teich 1998 , applied theory of dynamic programming (Gluss 1972 , Neumann 1977 , and network analysis (cf. Noltemeier 1976 , Jungnickel 1994 , Economides 1996 .
Evaluating this case we come to the conclusion that it is a theoretically interesting borderline-case well-suited to discuss the given definitions of The preceding classification of development processes may be reconsidered from the viewpoint of infrastructure model building. However, we should observe that the number of infrastructure models is substantial and that these models generally do not fit together. Each model has its own approach and structure and aims at its specific objective of explanation. Therefore a satisfying overview of existing infrastructure modeling is beyond the scope of this paper. Some examples must do here.
All of the mentioned development situations may be discussed within the framework of a model given by Frey (1969) . In contrast, a growth model formulated by Siebert (1971) solely concentrates on the effects of material infrastructure (above mentioned case 2b), again restricting his analysis to production effects and mobility effects of the infrastructure capital stock.
A dynamic model constructed by Buhr (2001) deals with the macroeconomic supply-demand determination of regional equilibrium incomes in regional goods markets as a framework for discussing the implications of competition among regions. The author separates demanded and supplied infrastructure capital of two regions embedded in the nation, thus being able to discuss at least the above mentioned cases 2a), 2b), and 2d) at the level of each region. The supply side of the model is represented by different regional production functions which include the supplied regional capital stock of infrastructure, leaving aside the stock of human capital and the private capital stock. The production functions generate regional factor demand, here specifically the regional demand for infrastructure capital. The corresponding regional supply of infrastructure capital is mainly varied by regional public investment; capital depreciation does not occur. Public investment is residually determined on the basis of the assumption that there are balanced budgets for the public sectors of the regions and the nation.
With respect to the residual determination of public investment this approach leaves a blank spot that may be closed by a political model of economic growth as suggested by Frey (1968) . He discriminates the application of this model according to the excess supply of or excess demand for infrastructure, stressing the inseparable interplay of economic and political forces in reality. As valuable as such contributions are, they have unfortunately the disadvantage of not being formalized.
The general result of the development-theoretic considerations is that the above given definitions of infrastructure are useful in the context of economic development.
Infrastructure policy
As before we assume that the state is responsible for creating and maintaining the institutional infrastructure of a nation that forms the main reference of infrastructure policy. From an economic point of view, the government guarantees and protects the economic order that is changed by the pertaining policy. The economic order sets rules for state activities and private economic operations, that is, also for the existence and production of personal and material infrastructure, here assumed to be supplied by private initiatives (government activities in these fields are understood to be temporary exceptions). Thus, the policy of the economic order, apart from other objectives, concentrates on the variations of personal infrastructure (changing the rules of, for example, population policy, labor market policy, and education policy) and of material infrastructure (changing, for example, the rules of capital policy). In other words: private producers of personal and material infrastructure must strictly be controlled by institutional infrastructure. In this context, the policy of the economic order may be supported by utility-related or (private or social) profit-related policy measures such as tax incentives. The main point is the integration and activation of different policies in the sense of the given economic order and the proposed definitions of infrastructure.
Possible policy results are -change of structure of infrastructure capital stocks,
-substitution between material and personal infrastructure (for example, introduction of modern telecommunication services),
-reduction of activity-independent costs of economic units' consumption or production (cf., for example, Conrad/Seitz 1992 . Infrastructure policy at the national level refers to institutional infrastructure (cf. also Momberg 2000: 284-288 ) and thus, within this framework, also to personal and material infrastructure. Its main general objective is to mobilize the relevant potentialities of economic agents.
While we stressed the dominance of institutional infrastructure at the level of the entire economy, we may also concentrate on the dominance of material infrastructure, particularly looking at individual categories of material infrastructure that are supported by pertaining types of personal and institutional infrastructure.
Let us consider the following two examples.
(1) Whatever category of infrastructure is considered to be dominant, an essential task of infrastructure policy will be to maintain and improve the complementarities, the integration and cooperation, of institutional, personal and material infrastructure. In this sense the realization of the notion of infrastructure is relevant for progress in economic development, particularly in times that lack satisfactory concepts of economic policy.
